Semântica de Perguntas e Respostas by Schang, Fabien
DOI: https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v8i1.32835
Question-Answer Semantics
[Semântica de Perguntas e Respostas]
Fabien Schang*
Abstract: The present paper deals with a special kind of many-valued semantics:
Question-Answer Semantics, in which logical values are products of questions about
semantic predicates (‘true’, ‘false’, etc.) and corresponding answers (‘yes’, ‘no’, etc.). It
purports to clarify some difficulties related to what is meant by basic speech-acts like as-
sertion and denial. Deep disagreements occur whenever any two speakers disagree about
the meaning of the words they use. In the special case of truth-values, Frege took these
as the referents of propositions that are classes of sentences accepted (‘true’) or rejected
(‘false’). Starting from this usual depiction of truth and falsehood, a general algebraic
framework ARnm is proposed in order to systematize the use of truth-values within a
dialectical perspective of logic. A special attention is paid to two pseudo-speakers
radically opposed, namely: Heraclitus, and Nagarjuna, according to whom truth-values
refer to everything and nothing, respectively. In the end, a dialectical (pseudo-Hegelian)
negation is sketched as a very peculiar function, namely: as an ontological object-forming
operator, which is similar to the arithmetic successor-forming operator Sn+1(x) applied
to integers and also matches with a generalized theory of truth-values as Millian or
Kripkean proper names.
Keywords: Affirmation. Bivalent answerhood. Aufhebung. Negation. Truth-values.
Resumo: O presente artigo trata de um tipo especial de semântica de múltiplos valores:
Semântica de Perguntas e Respostas, na qual valores lógicos são produtos de perguntas
sobre predicados semânticos (’verdadeiro’, ’falso’, etc.) e respostas correspondentes
(’sim’, ’não’ etc.). Pretende esclarecer algumas dificuldades relacionadas ao que se
entende por atos básicos de fala, como afirmação e negação. Discordâncias profundas
ocorrem sempre que dois falantes discordam acerca do significado das palavras que
usam. No caso especial dos valores de verdade, Frege os tomou como os referentes de
proposições que são classes de sentenças aceitas (’verdadeiras’) ou rejeitadas (’falsas’).
Partindo dessa representação comum da verdade e da falsidade, é proposta uma estru-
tura algébrica geral ARnm, a fim de sistematizar o uso de valores de verdade em uma
perspectiva dialética da lógica. Uma atenção especial é dada a dois pseudo-falantes
radicalmente opostos, a saber: Heráclito e Nagarjuna, segundo os quais os valores de
verdade se referem, respectivamente, a tudo e nada. No final, uma negação dialética
(pseudo-hegeliana) é esboçada como uma função muito peculiar, a saber: como um
operador ontológico gerador de objetos, semelhante ao operador aritmético gerador
de sucessores Sn+1(x) aplicado a números inteiros e também combina com uma teoria
generalizada de valores de verdade como nomes próprios milianos ou kripkeanos.
Palavras-chave: Afirmação. Aufhebung. Negação. Respostas bivalentes. Valores de
verdade.
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1. Introduction: Beyond Yes and No
Thought is saying no, and it is to itself
that thought says no.
(Alain, Remarks on Religion, 1924)
A general ambition of the present paper
is to implement the above quotation, by
showing how meaningful it is. This sta-
tement is composed of two parts, the
first of which is to be qualified by the
second part. Our thesis is that, by ana-
logy with paraconsistency, negation is
no more nor less essential to rational
thinking than consistency is essential
to logical thinking: despite their consi-
derable role in both domains, they are
not indispensable after all. At the same
time, negating the role of logical nega-
tion is still a process of negation, so that
a crucial diculty is to see in what level
of discourse negation is referred to. Our
method to make this point will consist
in analyzing thought in general and lo-
gic in particular in the light of one and
the same process: dialogue.
Let us consider any two participants
of a dialogue D = 〈Q,A〉 between, say,
Quinn et Alan. Quinn asks only with
yes- and no-answers to Alan about an
arbitrary proposition ϕ, in order to get
informations about it. How many ques-
tions can be asked by Quinn about ϕ,
and what answers can be expected from
Alan? A normal account should run as
follows: ϕ is true or false according to
Alan, given that ϕ is expressed by a de-
clarative statement. Let the sentential
content of ϕ be ‘It will rain tomorrow’.
If the question is
Quinn – Will it rain tomorrow?
then Alan is supposed to reply
Alan – Yes.
to state his opinion that ϕ is true. Then
Alan thinks that it will rain tomorrow;
if the question is
Quinn – Will it not rain tomorrow?
then Alan is supposed to reply
Alan – No.
to state his opinion that ϕ is not true,
i.e. false. Hence Alan thinks that it will
rain tomorrow.
At the same time, Alan may fall short
of arguments to be entitled to give a
definite answer. If it is the case, then it
should be perfectly normal to hear Alan
replying
Alan – I do not know.
thereby alluding to the fact that he is
not able to answer either positively or
negatively to whether or not it will rain
tomorrow. Does this not mean that the
proposition ϕ is neither true nor false?
Not at all, so long as a clear-cut distinc-
tion is made between what propositi-
ons are and what is known about them.
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However, a somehow curious situation
might be the one in which Alan replies
Alan – Well, yes and no.
How can a proposition be true and false
without altering the meaning of truth
and falsehood? A way to account for
this first oddity consists in introducing
viewpoints in the basic semantics we
are going to use to make sense of dia-
logues. Thus, ‘yes and no’ might mean
that ϕ may be true from one viewpoint
and false from another one, thereby re-
ducing the surprising reply to a case
of facile relativism. For example, Alan
may have seen the local weather bro-
adcast on TV and heard there that rain
is announced in his city for the coming
day. So Alan is justified to think that
ϕ is true. At the same time, his farmer
cousin told him that rain will not fall
due to the behavior of birds and insects
in his own farm. Hence Alan is also jus-
tified to think that ϕ is false. Deciding
who is more reliable between a weather
broadcast and an experienced farmer is
not our point, however; Alan is merely
entitled to answer ‘yes-and-no’ in the
present case for want of any conclusive
reason at hand, and this does not imply
anything about whether it will eventu-
ally rain or not.
Now the game could be pushed
further, soon leading to even more
awkward dialogical situations. What
happens if, for example, Alan replies
Alan – Neither yes-and-no nor neither-
yes-nor-no?
It seems highly implausible for any-
body to face such a dubious reply in
daily life, and a semanticist of natu-
ral language might take this empiri-
cal data as a sucient reason to discard
its relevance. Now here is the point
at which things become interesting to
us, actually. The issue concerns the li-
mits of rationality in a dialogue: are
there impossible replies in every dialo-
gical situation, such that no agent could
be considered as a rational agent by
stating them? In order to tackle this
meta-question, we are going to pro-
pose a framework intended to set forth
a formal semantics and its main com-
ponents, that is, truth-values, thus ge-
neralizing a question-answer semantics
introduced in Schang (2015) and pa-
ralleling the extended debate around
new versions of the Liar Paradox with
Shramko & Wansing (2006)’s theory of
generalized truth-values. Before that, it
is to be noted that the following dialo-
gical framework differs from the logi-
cal trend set out in Lorenzen & Lorenz
(1978) and called ‘dialogical logic’. For
there are clear-cut differences between
the latter and the concept of ‘dialogue’
as depicted throughout the present pa-
per. Firstly, dialogic logic present any
dialogue as a disagreement between a
proponent P and an opponent O, whilst
our present dialogue includes a neutral
Questioner and an Answerer. Although
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the questioner may raise some doubts
about how rational the answers may be,
we will see that this situation comes
from other reasons. Secondly, the dif-
ference in dialogical logic between two
sorts of rules for dialogical games, na-
mely: particle rules (to specify the mea-
ning of logical constants) and structural
rules (to organize the course of the dia-
logue between P and O) need not be sta-
ted hereby for want of any conflictual
relation between Q and A. Thirdly, the
present semantic framework will pro-
pose several kinds of statements for any
given sentential question whereas dia-
logical logic usually relies upon simple
armations made by P and denials made
by O. Although Rückert (2004) illustra-
ted a many-valued dialogical logic, our
aim is to extend this move by introdu-
cing non-bivalent answers in addition to
the non-bivalent truth-values.
2. Generalizing the Question-Answer
Game
Let ARnm be any such set of questions-
answers related to an arbitrary propo-
sition ϕ. This framework consists of
a finite number of answers to a finite
number of corresponding questions. A
primitive situation is the one where
Alan gives no reply to Quinn: he re-
mains silent, thus according no indi-
cation about the value of ϕ. One can
depict this framework as a set of ques-
tions and answers formulated by Quinn
and Alan, respectively.
Q – ϕ?
A – . . . .
Q – Not ϕ?
A – ... .
Quinn may ask as many questions as
she pleases, this will not change the
number of corresponding answers as
long as Alan remains silent. Silence is
what it is, namely: a plain absence of
value assigned to ϕ. Given that the va-
lue of a proposition finds its expression
in an answer, we say that the proposi-
tion ϕ has no value in the above dia-
logue. It could be objected to it that
a big confusion results from this pro-
cess, i.e. a confusion between the truth-
value of a proposition and a belief ex-
pressed about it. Indeed, ϕ is true or
false whatever Alan may believe about
it. There are at least two reasons not to
take such a critics into account, howe-
ver: the nature of truth-values is not
taken for granted, if not by some hy-
pothetical metaphysicians of logic. But
also, truth-values proceed as sets of
answers whose circumscribing rules are
still unexplained. We follow in this res-
pect the reply addressed by Wansing &
Belnap (2010) to Dubois (2008), accor-
ding to which a truth-value does not ex-
press a belief but an information.
A broader framework is the two-valued
or bivalent one, in which every propo-
sition is either true or false. In such
a case, Alan is always in position to
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give an affirmative or negative answer
to Quinn. And even in the case in which
Alan does not feel secure with her sour-
ces at hand, he will take a decision by
arguing for either the truth or the fal-
sity of ϕ.
The general rationale underlying
ARnm = {L,Q(ϕ),A(ϕ),Vnm} includes a for-
mal language L with a finite set of for-
mulas ϕ (atomic or molecular) and lo-
gical constants, two kinds of sentential
functions Q(ϕ) and A(ϕ), and a do-
main of valuation Vnm. The question
function Q(ϕ) = 〈q1(ϕ), . . . ,qn(ϕ)〉 ap-
plies to an arbitrary formula ϕ. It con-
sists of a number of sentential questi-
ons, i.e. questions n related to the se-
mantic predicates assigned to ϕ: ‘true’
or ‘false’, in the mainstream case of
bivalence; but it may also be ‘both-
true-and-false’, ‘neither-true-nor-false’,
and the like. The answer function
A(ϕ) = 〈a1(ϕ), . . . ,an(ϕ〉 assigns m kinds
of sentential answers, i.e. direct answers
related to each of the preceding ques-
tions about the semantic value(s) of ϕ.
These answers are ‘yes’ and ‘no’, in the
usual cases. But they may also be ‘yes-
and-no’ or ‘neither-yes-nor-no’, in other
unusual cases which are to be explai-
ned later on. The number of questions
and related answers available in a de-
finite dialogical context gives rise to a
domain of values Vnm including a total
number of mn = 22 = 4 truth-values.
It is important to see that the ‘truth-
values’ of the dialogical framework
ARnm do not merely correspond to the
usual semantic predicates like ‘true’,
‘false’, and the like; rather, they are
answers related to these semantic pre-
dicate(s) assigned to a given formula.
For example, stating that the formula
ϕ is true means that the answerer of
a given dialogical game says ‘yes’ to
the first ordered question whether ϕ
is true. In symbols: a1(ϕ) = 1. In the
contrary case, saying that ϕ is false me-
ans that the answerer says ‘yes’ to the
second ordered question whether ϕ is
false. In symbols: a2(ϕ) = 1. It results
from this dialogical semantics that the
truth-bearers of it are not propositions
but, rather, statements: a proposition is
taken to be true if and only if one given
speaker states something about it du-
ring a given dialogue.
It may be objected to this seman-
tics that it complicates the usual truth-
functional semantics irrelevantly, by in-
troducing a useless distinction between
propositions and statements and even
relativizing the semantic predicates in a
dangerous way. Apart from philosophi-
cal considerations about the nature of
truth-values, the following wants to
show that such a dialogical and alge-
braic semantics is in position to aug-
ment both the expressive and explana-
tory power of formal languages. Con-
sider for instance a situation in which
the speaker assumes that one answer to
one question suces to characterize her
statement about the atomic proposition
p. Then she will answer either ‘yes’ or
‘no’ to the question whether p is true,
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without any further ado:
(1) ‘Yes, I state that it will rain tomor-
row.’ (in symbols: a1(p) = 1)
or
(2) ‘No, I do not state that it will rain
tomorrow.’ (in symbols: a1(p) = 0)
Now the agent can also combine
answers to more than only one ques-
tion, to make her position more expli-
cit:
(1*) ‘Yes, I state that it will rain tomor-
row; and no, I do not state that it will
not rain tomorrow.’ (in symbols: a1(p) =
1,a2(p) = 0))
or
(2*) ‘No, I do not state that it will
rain tomorrow; and yes, I state that it
will not rain tomorrow.’ (in symbols:
a1(p) = 0,a2(p) = 1)).
Why bother with (1*)–(2*)? In or-
der to clarify the logical relations of
dependence or independence that are
supposed to stand behind the agents’
answers. For the case (2) is still am-
biguous. Does (2) mean the same as
(2*)? The speaker may deny p without
arming anything after all, as in the case
in which she does not feel herself in po-
sition to state arguably and prefer to
suspend her judgment. The aim of the
general framework ARnm is to disambi-
guate such situations and to explain,
for instance, in what dialogical games
saying ‘no’ to the question whether ϕ
is true is or is not the same as saying
‘yes’ to the question whether ϕ is false.
It also purports to clarify the way in
which concepts like affirmation and ne-
gation are used in this respect, inso-
far as some muddle generally occurs
about what these concepts are suppo-
sed to mean. Are affirmation and nega-
tion two opposed speech-acts made by
speakers, or are they properties of the
formula expressed by speakers? The
famous Principle of Bivalence (PBV)
stands at the core of this issue, and we
assume in the following that a clear-cut
distinction between truth-values and
speech-acts is essential towards a se-
mantic clarification.
(PBV) For every formula ϕ, either ϕ is
true or ϕ is false:
a1(ϕ) = 1 if, and only if, a2(ϕ) = 0.
A systematic treatment of such dialo-
gical situations requires to take into
consideration games that stand beyond,
but also beneath the mainstream dialo-
gues where (PBV) holds. The variety of
dialogical games is determined by the
kinds of questions and answers at hand.
A way to make sense of the m avai-
lable answers in an arbitrary domain of
values Vnm echoes to and extends earlier
works strictly devoted to semantic pre-
dicates, especially Shramko & Wansing
(2006)’s process of generalized truth-
values. Let Y be a basic answer, ‘yes’.
It can be viewed as a singleton {Y }, that
is, a set of answers Sm = S1 including
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m = 1 element. In the vein of cons-
tructive values, any given set Sm can be
partitioned into posets P (Sm). A parti-
tion of S1 leads to the two-element set
S2 = {Y ,Y }, where {Y }means the failure
of yes-answer and can be equated with
the ‘no’-answer N . Thus S2 = {Y ,N }. A
partition of S2 leads to the four-element
set S4 = {YY ,Y ,Y ,Y Y }, where YY can
be read as ‘both yes and no’ and YY as
‘neither yes nor no’. And so on, inde-
finitely. A central problem is to make
intuitive sense of the complex answer
standing beyond ‘yes’ and ‘no’, assu-
ming that the latter is already a com-
plex element of the form Y . Let us try
to do this in the following illustration of
dialogical semantics, by motivating the
increasing number of the n questions
and m answers. The basic answer value
Y and its complement Y will be sym-
bolized by the Boolean values 1 and 0,
for sake of simplicity. As for the com-
plex answers combining yes- and no-
answers, both their interpretation and
symbolization will be explained in the
following.
3. Beyond Bivalent Answerhood
There are two categories of trivial se-
mantics in ARnm, those in which the di-
alogue leads to no relevant information
because it is impossible to discriminate
what the answerer accepts and rejects.
The first category is the semantics in
which no answer is available at all, so
that the corresponding dialogue is not
a real one.
0-valent semantics
ARnm = AR
n
0 = AR0
Q(ϕ) = 〈q1(ϕ), . . . ,qn(ϕ)〉
A(ϕ) = a1(ϕ), with a1 = ∅
Note that, in the above case, the absence
of answer means the absence of any cor-
responding kind of answer: Y is alre-
ady a proper answer, so that it differs
from a pure absence of answer just as
the empty set differs as a plain set ∅ or
an element of a set {∅} –compare with
Y =N in S2.
The second category corresponds to any
dialogical situation including only one
available answer.
1-valent semantics
ARnm = AR
n
1 = AR
1
Q(ϕ) = 〈q1(ϕ), . . . ,qn(ϕ)〉
A(ϕ) = a1(ϕ), with a1 7→ {1}
A(ϕ) ∈ {〈1〉}
There may be an indefinite number n
of such univalent semantics, that is, so
many instances as there can be different
kinds of questions about a formula. At
the same time, only one kind of answer,
‘yes’, is available in these primitive se-
mantics including the basic yes-answer:
a1(ϕ) = 1. In other words, any semantic
including only one, negative no-answer
will be treated as a fragment of the next
game semantics rather than a proper
one-valued semantics.
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2-valent semantics
ARnm = AR
1
2 = AR2
Q(ϕ) = 〈q1(ϕ)〉
A(ϕ) = a1(ϕ), with a1 7→ {1,0}
A(ϕ) ∈ {〈1〉,〈0〉}
AR12 is the dialogical semantics charac-
teristic by any logical system obeying
(PBV), that is, all these in which any
formula ϕ is taken to be true or false:
nothing more beyond S2, and nothing
less beneath S2. Such an application of
(PBV) means that a1(ϕ) = 1 if and only
if a2(ϕ) = 0, as is the case in AR
1
2: every
yes-answer to the question whether ϕ
is true (or false) entails a no-answer to
the question whether ϕ is false. More-
over, it is worthwhile to see that such
a characterization of (PBV) never appe-
als to the logical constant of sentential
negation, which is part and parcel of a
proposition ϕ by yielding the negative
formula ¬ϕ. In other words, (PBV) uni-
quely concerns the semantic predicates
of truth and falsity. At the same time,
(PBV) can also be entertained dialogi-
cally as a yes-no principle ruling the
correct use of sentential answers. Thus,
(PBV*) Every sentential question qi(ϕ)
must be answered either positively or
negatively:
either ai(ϕ) = 1, or ai(ϕ) = 0.
It turns out that (PBV*) differs from
(PBV), however. For imagine a spea-
ker that answers positively both to the
question whether ϕ is true and ϕ is
false. Then such a speaker obeys (PBV*)
but infringes (PBV) by stating that ϕ is
true and false at once. The question of
how such a situation can make sense is
still to be explained.
4-valent semantics
ARnm = AR
2
2 = AR
4
Q(ϕ) = 〈q1(ϕ),q2(ϕ)〉
A(ϕ) = 〈a1(ϕ),a2(ϕ)〉, with ai(ϕ) 7→ {1,0}
A(ϕ) ∈ {〈1,1〉,〈1,0〉,〈0,1〉,〈0,0〉}
This semantics echoes with Belnap
(1977)’s logic FDE, given the transla-
tion B = 〈1,1〉, T = 〈1,0〉, F = 〈0,1〉, and
N = 〈0,0〉. It clearly appears that such
a speaker still obeys (PBV*) whilst vio-
lating (PBV). Belnap’s model of compu-
ter networks also helps to make sense
of such non-bivalent answers, in ac-
cordance with an epistemic interpre-
tation of truth-values and by dealing
with semantic predicates as informa-
tions given by a single computer: any
two computers of a single network may
deliver mutually inconsistent informa-
tions about a given sentence ϕ whilst
the agent has no reason to favor either
one. In such a case, there is evidence
both for the truth and the falsity of ϕ
and the speaker is entitled to answer
positively to both the question whether
ϕ is told true and whether ϕ is told
false. Oppositely, there may be a situ-
ation in which no information at all is
available about ϕ; in such a case, the
speaker is entitled to answer negatively
to the same paired questions q1(ϕ) and
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q2(ϕ).
8-valent semantics
ARnm = AR
3
2 = AR8
Q(ϕ) = 〈q1(ϕ),q2(ϕ),q3(ϕ)〉
A(ϕ) = 〈a1(ϕ),a2(ϕ),a3(ϕ)〉,
with ai(ϕ) 7→ {1,0}
A(ϕ) ∈ {〈1,1,1〉,〈1,1,0〉,〈1,0,1〉,〈0,1,1〉,
〈1,0,0〉,〈0,1,0〉,〈0,0,1〉,〈0,0,0〉}
Here is a more peculiar semantics that
is the powerset of a three-valued system
such that AR8 = P (AR3), AR3 being a
fragment of the previous AR4. Thus,
AR8 is also a fragment of the next full
set of n = 4 questions AR42 = AR16. In
AR8, the additional sentential question
q3(ϕ) can be read in two distinct ways:
as whether ϕ is both true and false, or
as ϕ is neither true nor false.
Now what about the case in which
the speaker answers positively to it?
This seems absurd, insofar as the same
speaker already answered positively to
the question whether ϕ is true and
whether ϕ is false. If so, what can
the difference be between ϕ’s being told
true, told false, and told both? Actu-
ally, a crucial distinction is to be made
hereby between successive and simulta-
neous valuations. A successive valuation
means that ϕ is told true only and then
false only, whereas a simultaneous va-
luation means that ϕ is told both-true-
and-false at one and the same situation.
The latter may be accounted in terms
of nested networks. Let us consider
three computer networks c1, c2, c3 rela-
ted to each other in a nested network
C = {c1, c2, c3}. In c1 there is evidence for
ϕ, so that ϕ is told true therein; in c2
there is evidence against ϕ, so that ϕ is
told false therein. And in c3 there is evi-
dence both for and against ϕ, so that ϕ
is told both-true-and-false therein. The
whole network system C thereby re-
sults in a valuation system in which the
speaker is entitled to hold ϕ true, false,
and both at once. Another instance
of dialogical semantics AR8 will be the
one in which q3(ϕ) is about whether ϕ
is neither true and false.
The process of nesting computer
networks can be used increasingly,
in order to account for any powerset
P (ARnm) of any given dialogical seman-
tics ARnm. In all such cases, the number
of available answers n = 2 is constant,
thereby obeying (PBV*) and matching
both with Belnap (1977)’s semantic pat-
tern of single computer network and
its extension by Shramko & Wansing
(2006). Now a trickier dialogical situa-
tion is the following, where more than
n = 2 possible answers may occur.
9-valent semantics
ARnm = AR
2
3 = AR9
Q(ϕ) = 〈q1(ϕ),q2(ϕ)〉
A(ϕ) = 〈a1(ϕ),a2(ϕ)〉, with ai(ϕ) 7→
{1,1/2,0}
A(ϕ) ∈ {〈1,1〉,〈1,1/2〉,〈1,0〉,〈1/2,1〉,〈1/2,1/2〉,
〈1/2,0〉,〈0,1〉,〈0,1/2〉,〈0,0〉}
A primary task consists in inter-
preting the ‘non-bivalent’ answer 1/2,
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which goes beyond the domains ru-
led by (PBV*). The model of com-
puter networks that has been introdu-
ced earlier does not rely upon either
a probabilistic or modal interpretation
of truth-values. Therefore, 1/2 cannot
be read as ‘maybe’, ‘possibly’ and the
further answers like, e.g., 1/4 will not
be read as ‘rather no than yes’, either.
Rather, let us consider any extension of
the ‘bivalent’ or pure yes-no answers as
combinations of such answers in nes-
ted networks. The above set of 9-
valued semantics includes two catego-
ries of question-answer games, depen-
ding upon the ‘glutty’ or ‘gappy’ in-
terpretation to be assigned to the third
answer.
In the first interpretation, 1/2 = {1,0}
is to be read ‘yes and no’ to a senten-
tial question whether, e.g., ϕ is true:
q1(ϕ). We specify this ‘glutty’ semantic
game by a positive lower case symbol,
AR23+. The domain of answer values is
thus to be reformulated in AR23+ as fol-
lows: ai(ϕ) ∈ {1, {1,0},0}. Let us consider
for example some computer network c1
where there is evidence for and no evi-
dence against ϕ, together with another
related network c2 in which there is evi-
dence both for and against ϕ (see Fi-
gure 1). The non-bivalent answer ‘yes
and no’ does make sense in this nested
network, insofar as the no-answer of c1
and the yes-answer of c2 about ϕ are
concatenated into a synthetic yes-and-
no-answer in C; this situation relevan-
tly differs from the situation in which
a sentence is said to be both true and
false, for ϕ is merely told true without
being told false in c1. At the same
time, it cannot be said in such a nes-
ted network that ϕ is both true and un-
true: such a combination does not make
sense by depriving a sentence of its se-
mantic predicated that has been stated
initially. For this reason, an extension
of the dialogic games beyond the re-
alm of (PBV*) helps to augment the ex-
pressive power of ARnm by accounting
more complex answers in terms of nes-
ted networks.
Figure 1: A model for AR23+.
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In the second interpretation, 1/2 = {1,0}
is to be read ‘neither yes nor no’ and
we can specify this ‘gappy’ semantic
game by a negative lower case sym-
bol, AR23−. The corresponding domain
of answer values in AR23− is ai(ϕ) ∈
{1, {1,0},0}. This seems much more dif-
ficult to make sense than the ‘glutty’
case. For how can an answerer account
for a situation in which there is no evi-
dence either for or against the truth of
a sentence? A way to make sense of this
‘gappy’ answer is to entertain a situa-
tion in which either the answerer has
no full access to the computer network
and, thus, cannot answer to the sen-
tential question for want of exhaustive
computer data.
A final issue is what can be called an
‘Equivalence Problem’ between the se-
mantic games of ARnm. It can be formu-
lated in two main questions, namely:
Are there equivalences between the dif-
ferent question-answer games, so that it
would be useless to go further on with
the number of questions and answers?
What is the point of adding answers to
questions in any semantic game, from a
semantic point of view? Let us attempt
to answer to these two questions accor-
ding to their order of appearance.
Indeed, there seems to be no difference
in dialogical meaning between some ga-
mes like, e.g., AR32 and AR
2
3; at the
same time, there is a difference in the
number of corresponding truth-values
in these two games –8 and 9, respecti-
vely. More generally, there is no one-
one mapping between both questions-
answer games such that, for any m,n >
1 and m , n, ARmn , AR
m
n . Actually,
there is a deep difference between se-
mantic games with non-bivalent ques-
tions and non-bivalent answers: ac-
cording to the above interpretation of
the ‘glutty’ answers as indeterminate
answers –for want of available compu-
ter data, such a lacking situation has
no counterpart in the ‘glutty’ questi-
ons whenever the latter occur in de-
terminate computer networks. It re-
sults in the following set of equiva-
lence between the answer values of
AR8 and AR9, respectively: 〈1,0,0〉 =
〈1,0〉;〈0,1,0〉 = 〈0,1〉;〈1,1,0〉 = 〈1,1〉,
whilst all the other answers differ from
each other. The ultimate valuation
〈0,0,0〉 might appear as a situation in
which nothing can be answered posi-
tively about the sentence and, thus,
might be conceivably taken as a coun-
terpart of 〈1/2,1/2〉 = 〈{1,0}, {1,0〉. Yet,
any negative answer 0 entails a de-
terminate situation and thereby differs
from the indeterminate answer 1/2 =
〈{1,0}〉. Rather, the triple no-answer
should amount to a determinate situ-
ation in which the sentential questi-
ons are inappropriate to specify the
network at hand –the third question
q3(ϕ) should be replaced by the se-
mantic predicate ‘both true and false’
in place of ‘neither true nor false’, for
example.
Furthermore, the addition of new
questions helps to make more fine-
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grained distinctions between distinc-
tive meanings of the semantic predi-
cates. Consider the ‘gappy’ seman-
tic predicate, ‘neither true nor false’.
The answer of indeterminacy embed-
ded into AR9,ai(ϕ) = 1/2, can be equated
with Kleene’s third truth-value, ‘unk-
nown’; whereas the answer of indeter-
minacy embedded into AR8,a3(ϕ) = 1,
can be equated with Łukasiewicz’s third
truth-value, ‘undecided’. By this way,
our question-answer game throws more
light between usual many-valued sys-
tems and brings a more precise crite-
rion for individuating logical systems
through their domains of values: Ł3
should be characterized by the de-
terminate semantic game AR32, where
ai(ϕ) = 1/2 is the gappy sentential
answer; whilst K3 should be charac-
terized by the indeterminate semantic
game AR23 = AR9, where q3(ϕ) is about
a gappy sentential question. Another
such criterion of individuation for logi-
cal systems is about their characteristic
sets of logical constants in a logical sys-
tem; we tackle this point later on.
The general rationale of our game se-
mantics can be afforded for any inter-
pretation of the questions and answers.
mn-valued semantics
ARnm
Q(ϕ) = 〈q1(ϕ), . . . ,qn(ϕ)〉
A(ϕ) = 〈a1(ϕ), . . . ,an(ϕ)〉, with ai(ϕ) 7→
{1,1− 1/(n− 1), . . . ,1/(n− 1),0}
A(ϕ) ∈ {〈1, . . . ,1〉, . . . ,〈0, . . . ,0〉} (each
ai(ϕ) being an element of the n-tuple
A(ϕ).)
Once the formal machinery ARnm is set-
tled, we are in position to account for a
number of disagreements as deaf dialo-
gues between speakers, that is, as resul-
ting from disagreements between their
question-answer backgrounds. This
may also throw a new light upon the
way in which some allegedly ‘irratio-
nal’ behaviors correspond to so-called
‘impossible’ answer values and actually
resort to alternative rationalities.
4. Impossible answers
In their theory of generalized truth-
values, Shramko & Wansing (2006)
extended a former notion introdu-
ced by Priest (1984), namely: hyper-
contradiction, meaning that higher le-
vels of contradiction may appear within
rational discourse. For example, a pro-
position is hyper-contradictory if it is
both true-and-false and merely true. In
the line of these kinds of structured va-
luations, Shramko & Wansing went on
positing the existence of other combi-
nations than mere truth and mere fal-
sity: both-true-and-false and neither-
true-nor-false (symbol: {B,N }), true and
both-true-and-false) (symbol: {T ,B}),
and so on, by virtue of a combination
of elements within a finite set of truth-
values. These values are called ‘im-
possible’. Does this mean that such a
process is nothing but an ‘algebraic de-
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vice uninterpreted’, as famously said
by Quine against any extension of lo-
gic beyond bivalence? Following Aris-
totle’s Principle of Non-Contradiction
(PNC),
It is impossible for anyone to believe
that a same thing is and is not, as said
by Heraclitus according to some. For it
is not necessary to agree with what has
been said (by Heraclitus).1
This amounts to say that no proposition
and its negation are true at once. Let ϕ
be an arbitrary proposition, and ¬ϕ be
its sentential negation. Contradiction is
expressed by the conjunction ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ,
and a semantic translation of this form
results in ‘ϕ is true and ϕ is not true’,
i.e., ‘ϕ is true and ϕ is false’. The logical
constants of ARnm need to be explained
now to make this point clearer, since
(PNC) refers to sentential negation and
conjunction. These can be characteri-
zed in the same way, irrespective of the
number of questions and answers in a
given dialogical game.
Let A(ϕ) = 〈a1(ϕ), . . . ,an(ϕ)〉 be the
truth-value of any statement made by a
answerer about ϕ. Then the value of its
sentential negation ¬ϕ can be charac-
terized in two ways, depending upon
the number n of sentential questions:
either as
A(¬ϕ) = 〈an(ϕ)〉
when n = 1, as in the semantic game
AR12 and its characteristic truth-table
ϕ ¬ϕ
1 0
0 1
or as
A(¬ϕ) = 〈an(ϕ), . . . ,a1(ϕ)〉
when n > 1. An illustration is given by
the semantic game AR32, where the or-
dered values are simplified in the form
A(ϕ) = abc.
ϕ ¬ϕ
111 111
110 011
101 101
011 110
100 001
010 010
001 100
000 000
The former kind of sentential negation
is an inversion-operator on answers,
such that ¬1 = 0. It proceeds from
the application of (PBV), according to
which any yes-answer to the question
whether ϕ is true is a no-answer to
the question whether ϕ is false, i.e.,
whether ¬ϕ is true. The latter kind of
sentential negation is a permutation-
operator on answers, such that it re-
verts the ordering of the single sen-
tential answers ai(ϕ) ∈ A(ϕ). It does
not proceed from (PBV) anymore but,
rather, from a more general principle
1Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 3, 1005 23-26.
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that does hold for every game seman-
tics:
(F = Neg) Every answer to the question
whether ϕ is false is the same as the
answer to the question whether ¬ϕ is
true.
Taking the aforementioned example
again (see Figure 1), let A(ϕ) = 〈1,1/2〉 =
〈1,{1,0}〉 in the semantic game AR23+
(where 1/2 is read ‘both yes and no’).
Then the speaker says ‘yes’ to the ques-
tion whether ϕ is true and ‘yes and
no’ to the question whether ϕ is false.
Let C = {c1, c2} the corresponding nes-
ted network such that there is evidence
for and no evidence against ϕ in c1, evi-
dence both for and against ϕ in c2. The-
refore, there is evidence against and no
evidence for ¬ϕ in c1, evidence both
against and for ϕ in c2 –which amounts
to the same as having evidence both for
and against ¬ϕ in c2. Hence A(¬ϕ) =
〈{1,0},1〉. We are going to apply (F =
Neg) in the following, in order to see
what may go wrong in dialogues where
Q and A do not assume the same do-
main of answer values.
The conjunction ϕ ∧ψ still needs be
defined beforehand. It assumes an or-
dering relation between each of the pai-
red single answers ai(ϕ),ai(ψ) included
into the ordered answers A(ϕ),A(ψ),
such that 1 > 0. Let ord(ai(ϕ),ai(ψ)) be
an ordering function applied to the pai-
red answer values of ϕ and ψ. Then
conjunction can be defined as follows in
any semantic game ARnm:
A(ϕ ∧ψ) = 〈ord(a1(ϕ),a1(ϕ)), . . . , ord(an(ψ),an(ψ))〉
It turns out that the meaning of ord
depends upon the semantic predicate
at hand in a given sentential question:
true, false, true-and-false, and the like.
Take the semantic game AR32, dealing
with the three semantic predicates T in
q1, F in q2, and B (orN ) in q3. When the
answer is about T , ord(ai(ϕ),ai(ψ)) ta-
kes the minimal value of the conjuncts
because any doubt about whether ϕ or
ψ is true makes the whole conjunction
ϕ ∧ψ doubtful itself. Thus
a1(ϕ ∧ψ) =min(ϕ,ψ)
When the answer is about F, the
contrary holds because the least evi-
dence against either ϕ or ψ is enough
to answer positively to the question
whether ϕ ∧ψ is false. Thus
a2(ϕ ∧ψ) =max(ϕ,ψ)
When the answer is about B (or N ), fi-
nally, the answer will depend upon the
meaning of 1/2: ‘both yes and no’, or
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‘neither yes nor no’. In the first ‘glutty’
case, then any failure of evidence for ϕ
or is sufficient to answer negatively to
ϕ ∧ψ. Thus
a3(ϕ ∧ψ) =min(ϕ,ψ) in AR3+2 .
In the second ‘gappy’ case, the indeter-
minate situation of either ϕ or ψ con-
taminates the whole and makes ϕ ∧ ψ
indeterminate as well. Thus
a3(ϕ ∧ψ) =max(ϕ,ψ) in AR3−2
It results in two kinds of characteristic
truth-tables for ϕ ∧ ψ in AR32, depen-
ding upon the meaning of the answer
value 1/2:
• in AR3+2 : A(ϕ ∧ψ) = 〈min(ϕ,ψ),max(ϕ,ψ),min(ϕ,ψ)〉
Example: if A(ϕ) = 〈1,1,0〉 and A(ψ) = 〈0,1,1〉, then A(ϕ ∧ψ) = 〈0,1,0〉
• in AR3−2 : A(ϕ ∧ψ) = 〈min(ϕ,ψ),max(ϕ,ψ),max(ϕ,ψ)〉
Example: if A(ϕ) = 〈1,1,0〉 and A(ψ) = 〈0,1,1〉, then A(ϕ ∧ψ) = 〈0,1,1〉
A third relevant logical constant
to be defined in ARnm is disjunction.
Although the latter is not concerned
with (PNC), it can be defined as the dual
of conjunction; this means that
A(ϕ ∨ψ) = 〈ord(a1(ϕ),a1(ψ)), . . . , ord(an(ϕ),an(ψ))〉
such that
ord(ai(ϕ),ai(ψ)) =max(ϕ,ψ) for ∨ whenever ord(ai(ϕ),ai(ψ)) =min(ϕ,ψ) for ∧
ord(ai(ϕ),ai(ψ)) =min(ϕ,ψ) for ∨ whenever ord(ai(ϕ),ai(ψ)) =max(ϕ,ψ) for ∧
Conditional could be also characterized
in ARnm; now it will be addressed into
the present paper, due to its ambiguity
from a many-valued point of view and
its irrelevance for the coming discus-
sion.2
2For an account of conditional in a particular case of ARnm, namely: AR
2
2 = AR4, see e.g. Schang (2017).
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Let us turn back to (PNC) and Aris-
totle’s logic. Why should it impos-
sible to think ‘contradictorily’, accor-
ding to him? The answer is: by virtue
of the bivalent framework assumed by
him in his logical framework AR12. In-
deed, whoever states therein that ϕ is
true thereby commits in thinking that
ϕ is not false and conversely, so that
there is no reply such that a speaker
could state the truth of ϕ and ¬ϕ si-
multaneously. Nothing prevents a pri-
ori Heraclitus from choosing a broa-
der framework inside ARnm, however.
Nothing is said thus far about the se-
mantic game that should characterize
the dialogical behavior of Heraclitus,
either –this point will be raised in the
final section. We merely state by now
that his behavior is not irrational, un-
less Aristotle is in position to show that
only AR12 makes sense for any rational
speaker. The Stagirite attempted to do
so by means of the so-called elenctic ar-
gument: although there exists no de-
ductive argument to demonstrate the
universal validity of PNC, it is often sta-
ted that whoever accepts a contradic-
tion is inevitably led to absurd conse-
quences and, thereby, eventually rejects
what she accepted initially.
Let us illustrate such a demonstration
by imagining a dialogue between Aris-
totle and Heraclitus, accordingly:
Aristotle – Is it the case that ϕ, that is,
¬ϕ is true?
Heraclitus – Yes, ϕ is true.
Aristotle – Hence¬ϕ is false, isn’t it?
Heraclitus – No.
Aristotle – You mean that both ϕ and
¬ϕ are true?
Heraclitus – Yes.
One first result is of relevance and ar-
gues against (PBV), in the above dia-
logue: accepting the falsity of ϕ may
not be the same as rejecting the truth
of ϕ for every speaker, whilst accepting
the falsity of ϕ is the same as accep-
ting the truth of ¬ϕ for any speaker. In-
deed, Heraclitus accepts ¬ϕ without re-
jecting its opposite ϕ, so that ϕ and ¬ϕ
are not exclusive from each other in his
viewpoint. That which is really ‘oppo-
sed’ from Aristotle’s viewpoint is not so
from Heraclitus’, and the phrase ‘true
contradiction’ makes sense only if these
two perspectives are conflated.
Here is the step at which Aristotle
should introduce his elenctic argument,
which is expected to play the role of
knock-down argument against the de-
fenders of true contradictions.
Aristotle – Well, let us suppose that
ϕ and ¬ϕ can be true together. Then
your position is indefensible, because
you should reject the negation of what
you just accepted.
Heraclitus – That is to say?
Aristotle – If you accept ϕ and ¬ϕ at
once, then you accept (ϕ ∧¬ϕ). And if
such is the case, then you cannot accept
¬(ϕ ∧¬ϕ). Therefore, you end up with
stating now that which you just rejected
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a few minutes ago. I am right, and you
are wrong.
Heraclitus ? Why so?!
Aristotle – Because that is how lan-
guage and thought are made, and you
cannot object anything to this neces-
sity. For this reason, you cannot ac-
cept and reject one and the same pro-
position at once. Consequently, you
must end with conceding (PNC) whe-
never you concede that a proposition
like (ϕ∧¬ϕ) cannot be accepted and re-
jected at once.
Heraclitus – I agree with the first part
of your conclusion. But not with the se-
cond one.
Aristotle – You cannot proceed in that
way!
Heraclitus – Yes I can, and I am going
to show it. I have told you that ϕ and
¬ϕ are true together, and I see no diffe-
rence between this affirmation and the
affirmation that (ϕ∧¬ϕ) is true as well,
in accordance to the meaning of con-
junction. However, you are mistaken
by assuming that I must reject ¬(ϕ ∧
¬ϕ) for the reason that I just accepted
(ϕ∧¬ϕ). It is normal to proceed in that
way so long as you assume that a propo-
sition and its negation are contradicto-
ries. You are free to do so, but nothing
prevents me from doing so in turn. I do
not proceed in that way, actually, and
that is why I accept both (ϕ ∧¬ϕ) and
its negation ¬(ϕ ∧¬ϕ). To sum up, ac-
cepting a formula is not the same as re-
jecting its negation. Or not for anyone,
at the very least, contrary to what you
seem to take it for granted.
Aristotle – What you just said does not
make sense. You cannot accept a con-
tradiction as you just did it, because
whoever proceeds in that way does not
say anything meaningful. This is just
noise, there is nothing meaningful in
these words.
Heraclitus – I do not accept a ‘contra-
diction’ by accepting both ϕ and ¬ϕ,
once again. This is a contradiction for
you, not for me.
Aristotle – You play with words, and
it is worthless to go on discussing with
you.
Heraclitus – As you please. I do not in-
tend to contradict you.
Aristotle – ... .
Translated into our question-answer
framework, the disagreement between
Aristotle and Heraclitus comes from
the fact that the former identifies
a2(ϕ) = 1 with a1(ϕ) = 0, insofar as
he does not conceive any other way of
thinking ϕ in his unique and restricted
framework AR12 = AR2 obeying (PBV).
Admittedly, there is no difference for
both Aristotle and Heraclitus between
‘ϕ’ and ‘ϕ is true’, on the one hand,
and ‘¬ϕ’ and ‘ϕ is false’, on the one
hand. But there is one strong difference
between ‘being told false’ and ‘being re-
jected’ for Heraclitus, whereas there is
none for Aristotle. The main point is
that, according to Aristotle, every rati-
onal speaker cannot but reject what is
taken to be false. Falsehood is a value
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to be rejected, by definition. But, once
again, a confusion arises between dis-
tinctive standards of rationality inside
crossed dialogues: that which is ‘false’
for Aristotle is not so with the same
sense of the word for Heraclitus, and
any reference to truth-values may lead
to misunderstandings whenever a dia-
logue includes speakers assuming diffe-
rent 16 semantic frameworks. It is as if
one refers to lines with a non-Euclidean
geometer, given that these do not have
for the latter the same features as for a
Euclidean geometer. In the same vein,
Heraclitus agrees that the negation of
a true proposition is false by defini-
tion; the point is that he will not re-
ject it after all. Both are acceptable, ac-
cording to him, and there is no contra-
dictory relation between a true propo-
sition and its negation in the formula
(ϕ ∧¬ϕ). If such is the case, which se-
mantic game is assumed by Heraclitus,
and what does it mean by the universal
truth of everything? Does it really think
so, by passing?
A similar difficulty arises whenever
any two speakers do not share the same
assumptions in their arguments, and
the logical problem is about whether
there are universal principles with
which everyone must comply as a ratio-
nal agent. For example, Priest (2010)
tackled the issue of the Tetralemma
to deal with the limits of thought. In
this issue borrowing from Indian phi-
losophy, a speaker, Nagarjuna, is bla-
med for saying nothing in particular by
answering negatively to whatever is as-
ked to him. Let us see what could result
from a dialogue between him and Aris-
totle.
Aristotle – Do you hold ϕ to be true?
Nagarjuna – No.
Aristotle – Alright. Then you hold ϕ to
be false?
Nagarjuna – No, either.
Aristotle – Again?! Listen, this mor-
ning I tried to discuss with Heraclitus.
He told me that he accepted not only ϕ
or ϕ but both at once, which does not
make sense. Are you doing the same by
rejecting ϕ and ¬ϕ at once? I mean, are
you alluding that these propositions are
not only true, despite their being true
together?
Nagarjuna – No more.
Aristotle – I will end up with knowing
what you are thinking, at any rate! It is
this: neither ϕ nor¬ϕ are true or false,
because these are neither true nor false.
That’s it?
Nagarjuna – No.
Aristotle – Enough, I am done with it.
Once again.
A usual version of the Tetralemma is
symbolized by the formal language of
bivalent logic, although we already in-
sisted on how misleading it may be to
identify ϕ and ¬ϕ with the syntactic
expressions of truth and falsehood.
(a) ϕ
(b) ¬ϕ
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(c) ϕ ∧¬ϕ
(d) ¬(ϕ ∧¬ϕ)
The contrary situation seems to occur
here above with respect to the first di-
alogue, insofar as the speaker rejects
whatever was accepted by Heraclitus.
To make sense of this context, most
of the commentators opted for an ex-
tension of the number of truth-values
beyond the four elements –true, false,
both, and none. The result is a lo-
gical threshold beyond which the spe-
aker ends with accepting or rejecting
what was rejected or accepted systema-
tically at the preceding level, by virtue
of a Law of Excluded (n + 1)th stating
that every proposition must have at le-
ast one of the n truth-values occurring
in a given finite set. The Law of Ex-
cluded Third is just a variant of the bi-
valent framework in which n = 2; Na-
garjuna seems to assume a different fra-
mework, given his four successive rejec-
tions.
Priest (2010) proposed a 5-valued se-
mantics for such a speaker, which
amounts to something like the fol-
lowing framework:
5-valued semantics
ARnm = AR
1
5 = AR5
Q(ϕ) = 〈q1(ϕ)〉
A(ϕ) = 〈a1(ϕ)〉, with ai(ϕ) 7→
{1,3/4,2/4,1/4,0}
A(ϕ) ∈ {〈1〉,〈3/4〉,〈2/4〉,〈1/4〉,〈0〉}
Priest (2010) interpreted Nagarjuna’s
attitude as an attitude of silence. But,
it may seem queer to consider silence
as a proper truth-value if every value
corresponds to an answer given by a
speaker to a preceding question. On
the contrary, the preceding framework
ARn0 = AR0 appears to be more appro-
priate to account for silence. Silence is
not a truth-value in this sense, it ap-
pears rather like a failure of value for
the related sentence. Moreover, should
Nagarjuna ever answer ‘no’ in the afo-
rementioned four questions, and why
could he not express his rejection once
more beyond the step (d) of the dialo-
gue?
In a nutshell, a similar problem oc-
curs with speakers like Heraclitus and
Nagarjuna: the former seems to accept
everything, whilst the latter seems to
accept nothing. If such is the case, then
there is no sense in proceeding so from
a logical point of view. For whoever
thinks in a logical way makes a minimal
partition between what is accepted and
what is rejected. Aristotle always ends
with the last word with paraconsis-
tent systems, insofar as the strategy of
extending the number of truth-values
beyond mere truth and mere falsehood
does not prevent him from eventually
imposing a general bipartition between
two sets of semantic predicates. Such
is the rationale behind Suszko’s reduc-
tion thesis [17], against the ‘mad idea’
of many-valuedness: bivalence corres-
ponds in his view to the framework in
which truth and falsehood occur as ul-
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timate sets of semantic predicates, and
any other truth-value can be reduced
to any of the two accepted general va-
lues –either the so-called ‘designated’,
accepted values, or the rejected values
–the so-called ‘non-designated’ values,
inside the class of the m answers.
Here is where rationality and logic may
take separate ways, however. Just as
alternative models have been designed
for non-Euclidean geometries, an alter-
native model Vnm might be promoted
for non-Aristotelian and, even, non-
Suszkian logics. Even beyond such a
logical achievement, we want to show
that an alternative model can be de-
signed in order to make sense of an
extension of truth-values without col-
lapsing again into the logical pattern
of Suszko’s bipartition. This consists in
replacing the process of partition by a
process of expansion.
5. From logic to dialectics through di-
alogue
An entirely different account of truth-
values can be given, by reference to
the dialectical process thesis-antithesis-
synthesis. Without contending to pre-
sent a genuine explication of what He-
gel said explicitly about logic, the fol-
lowing wants to show two things with
respect to Hegel’s expected import in
this domain: firstly, how our game se-
mantics is able to make sense formally
of Hegel’s concept of Aufhebung, in a
way that deeply departs from the usual
account of negation as a mapping over
a closed domain of truth-values; and se-
condly, to what extent a charitable in-
terpretation of dialectical negation is in
position to disentangle the general mi-
sunderstanding between Aristotle and
Heraclitus, or between Aristotle and
Nagarjuna.
For one thing, let us consider the
process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis.
There is at least one reason to pay atten-
tion to it, namely: ‘antithesis’ is closely
related to the logical concept of contra-
diction. Thus, let p be an arbitrary ato-
mic proposition. In the prime step of
thesis, p is affirmed by a speaker who
takes it to be true. In the second step of
antithesis, p is denied. This is symboli-
zed by a sentential negation on p, which
means that p is taken to be false as well.
This affirmation is contrary to the first
one, but it also expresses an affirmation
after all. In the third step of synthesis,
p and its negation ¬p are both affirmed.
Here is the step at which most of the
analyses take an end, due to the allege-
dly logical ‘impossibility’ of affirming
both the truth of a proposition p and
the truth of its negation ¬p, that is, both
the truth and falsity of p. What should
happen if we go on further, following
Heraclitus? A second level of dialec-
tics should be applied to the ultimate
affirmation of the preceding level, to-
gether with the similar processes of an-
tithesis and synthesis. Whilst a speaker
belonging to the framework AR12 = AR2
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would assimilate the preceding negated
to the Law of Excluded Third: p ∨ ¬p
(due to the ‘Morganian’ behavior of bi-
valent negation), the dialectician spea-
ker does not stop there and goes on by
making a further synthesis of the oppo-
sed affirmations.
What happens afterwards, and what
going on with such a process for? Here
is the main idea of the present paper:
the trouble with Heraclitus does not lie
in his dialogical behavior but, rather, in
the motivation that underlies it. This
motivation is not the one that logici-
ans are expected to have as a matter
of fact, when they refer to truth-values
and the construction of models inten-
ded to prove the validity or invalidity of
formulas. Our point is to show hereby
that Heraclitus does not affirm or deny
the truth-value of propositions; rather,
his point is to create truth-values, th-
rough a dialectical process of expan-
ding model. This requires some mini-
mal explication, before tackling its va-
rious upshots.
For this purpose, the process dialec-
tics will be applied to three diffe-
rent case studies: propositions, truth-
values, and integers. By applying the
dialectical process of thesis-antithesis-
synthesis three times successively, it re-
sults in a combination of simple objects
through a sequence of affirmations, ne-
gations, and aggregations of these:
Sentential dialectics
Level 1
Thesis p
Antithesis ¬p
Synthesis p∧¬p
Level 2
Thesis p∧¬p
Antithesis ¬(p∧¬p)
Synthesis (p∧¬p)∧¬(p∧¬p)
Level 3
Thesis (p∧¬p)∧¬(p∧¬p)
Antithesis ¬((p∧¬p)∧¬(p∧¬p))
Synthesis ((p∧¬p)∧¬(p∧¬p))∧¬((p∧¬p)∧¬(p∧¬p))
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The sentential reading of dialectics
does not seem appropriate, however.
On the one hand, the above three le-
vels are already equivalent with each
other in the semantic game AR22 = AR4,
whenever p is taken to be both true
and false. For then A(p) = A(¬p) =
A(p ∧ ¬p) = 〈1,1〉, and the same holds
for any kind of sentence ϕ. There-
fore, A(ϕ) = A(¬p) whenever A(ϕ) =
〈1,1〉. On the second hand, the increa-
sing complexity of the semantic games
does not rely upon the structural com-
plexity of sentences. Rather, it concerns
the increasing complexity of their se-
mantic predicates: T , F, B, N , T , B, and
so on; or the increasing complexity of
their answer values: ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘yes and
no’, ‘neither yes nor no’, ‘yes-and-no
and neither-yes-nor-no’, and so on. We
suspect Heraclitus to assume a seman-
tic game of the type ARn1 = AR1, where
only yes-answers apply to an indefini-
tely increasing set of semantic predica-
tes in n sentential questions.
In this second level of semantic pre-
dicates, negation proceeds by comple-
mentation and is symbolized by a hori-
zontal bar above the semantical predi-
cate of truth. Such a non-sentential ne-
gation of truth (or ‘non-truth’) refers to
whatever is not true within the whole
set of semantic predicates. This corres-
ponds uniquely to the predicate of fal-
sity in the bivalent framework AR12 =
AR2; but it need not be the case in
any higher-order framework of the type
ARnm whenever m,n ≥ 2.
Semantical dialectics
Level 1
Thesis >
Antithesis >
Synthesis >>
Level 2
Thesis >>
Antithesis >>
Synthesis >>>>
Level 3
Thesis >>>>
Antithesis >>>>
Synthesis >>>>>>>>
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The main difference between speakers
like Aristotle and Heraclitus lies in
their interpretation of double negation,
whenever speakers reject what they just
rejected at an earlier stage of discus-
sion. Whilst Aristotle would state that
whoever rejects p must affirm its ‘con-
tradictory’ ¬p, Heraclitus would not do
so; rather, he would go on negating the
propositions negated repeatedly. It is
clear that, in the light of the above ex-
plication, every level of discussion le-
ads to an even more complex statement,
and the structured statements of this
kind cannot be simplified without as-
suming a limitation of the framework
ARnm between any two speakers. Rather
than proceeding in this way, a third
comparison can be made between pro-
positions, truth-values, and integers.
Just as truth-values are viewed like
sets of propositions, integers are sets of
elements sharing a common property.
Starting from an integer symbolized by
1, any negation creates a difference by
adding a supplementary integer, the
latter being then combined to the pre-
ceding integer through the process of
synthesis. This results in a third integer
that is not identical either to the first or
to the second one.
Here is how natural integers can be
constructed dialectically, following a
previous analogy made between logic
and arithmetics in Schang (2016). Re-
ferring to the parlance of computer sci-
ence, the bits 1 and 0 are used to repre-
sent this increasing process of numbe-
ring. The latter was depicted by Leib-
niz, followed by a mapping between the
Book of Change, or Chinese Yi King, and
the numerical binary system.
Arithmetical dialectics
Level 1
Thesis 1
Antithesis 10 = 2
Synthesis 11 = 3
Level 2
Thesis 11 = 3
Antithesis 100 = 4
Synthesis 101 = 5
Level 3
Thesis 101 = 5
Antithesis 110 = 6
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Synthesis 111 = 7
Leibniz’s analogy may be also helpful
to account for the meaning of truth
and falsehood from a dialectical view-
point, strictly based on yes- and no-
answers. At least five statements may
result from it. Firstly, the basic bits 1
and 0 may be taken to be symbols of
Being and Non-Being. Secondly, each
antithesis occurs as a combination of
Being and Non-Being that extends the
domain of values, rather than splitting
it into distinctive parts. Thirdly, the
primary occurrence of truth (symbol:
1) in the above dialectical process me-
ans that every thing both participates
of and departs from it through the in-
troduction of Non-Being (symbol: 0).
Fourthly, the conspicuous occurrence
of Being entails that no proposition is
completely devoid of truth; consequen-
tly, ‘falsehood’ is merely another name
to designate whatever is not absolutely
true at the first level of dialectics –at
Level 1, and thereby includes a part of
Non-Being. Fifthly, falsehood is not the
complementary of truth at every step
of the dialectics; complementation and
falsehood are on a par only at the first
step of dialectics, wherein the entire do-
main of values includes two elements
only –truth, and falsehood.
Here lies the main and thorough diffe-
rence between the ‘logic’ of dialectics,
as expounded here above, and what is
ordinarily meant by a logical system:
dialectical values behave like singular
terms within an expanding model, whe-
reas logical values are sets of propositi-
ons splitting a basic common property.
The expanding model is what is meant
by an ‘expanding semantics’, in opposi-
tion to the ‘partitioning semantics’ that
usually depicts negation as a process of
dichotomy.
Let us consider the latter way of
conceiving negation, resulting in Lewis
Carroll’s diagrams of symbolic logic
and mentioned by Priest (2010) to ac-
count for the so-called Logic of Catus-
koti –or Tetralemma, by means of the
third diagram and its four elements.
Let 1 and 0 be the usual symbols for af-
firmative and negative answers to ques-
tions, respectively. Then partition can
be viewed as a particular case of ARnm,
i.e. an increasing game semantics ARn2
restricted to m = 2. It turns out that
the framework ARnm leads to results lar-
gely different from those of a partition
semantics like ARn2 (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Partition semantics in ARn2.
On the one hand, let us note that the
transition from each diagram to its suc-
cessor is made by means of an incre-
asing number of n questions (about
semantic predicates) and a constant
amount of m = 2 answers –yes, or no.
Thus, a primary diagram would cor-
respond to a framework AR02 = AR1,
where no asked question makes sense
within a uniform domain of omnipre-
sent truth. The above first particular
diagram embeds bivalence, where one
relevant question can be asked about
the unique property in the domain of
AR12 = AR2. The second diagram is
reminiscent of the four-valued algebra
of Belnap’s logical system FDE, which
includes n = 2 questions and m = 2
possible answers in AR22 = AR4. The
third last diagram AR32 = AR8 helps to
see how the preceding diagrams differ
from each other, that is, by adding one
question successively and thereby dou-
bling the number of semantic predica-
tes within a sequence of type ARn+12 .
And so on, for an increasing set of n
sentential questions.
On the the other hand, such a cons-
truction of truth-values by dichotomy
does not reproduce the dialectical pro-
cess thesis-antithesis-synthesis faith-
fully: one does not see how to go from
one level of judgement to another one
in these diagrams, and the introduc-
tion of new sets lets aside the addi-
tional mechanism we described previ-
ously. Dialectics proceeds by adding
one property, just as in the diagrams.
Nevertheless, the essential difference
lies in the number of available answers
from a dialectical viewpoint: only n =
1 answer holds there, as was the case
for Heraclitus and Nagarjuna in their
fictional dialogue with Aristotle. In
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other words, diagrams proceed by di-
chotomy in the increasing sequence of
frameworks ARn+12 , whereas dialectics
proceeds by expansion in the increasing
set of frameworks AR1n+1 = ARn+1. A
confusion between both models occurs
at n + 1 = 2, which corresponds to the
case in which only one semantic predi-
cate, viz. truth T , is available within the
domain of truth-values.
A last, but not least note on these re-
sults concerns the dialectical status of
‘contradiction’ in the light of ARnm.
Contradiction really occurs inside the
diagrammatic process of dichotomy, in-
sofar as each new box partially or com-
pletely excludes the other ones by re-
jecting at least one of their elements.
In the dialectical process of expansion,
however, the negation at hand does not
exclude but, rather, produces a new ob-
ject through the process of antithesis.
Moreover, each of the above boxes does
not express a mere addition or union
of single answers to sentential questi-
ons. For example, the box 110 of the
third particular diagram means ‘true
or neither-true-nor-false’, by junction of
the 3-tuples 100 and 010 within a fixed
set of 3-tuples: 100 ∪ 010 = 110. By
contrast, dialectics proceeds as an ag-
gregation of successive n-tuples. Unlike
the Boolean operations, the synthesis
111 does constitute neither the union ∪
nor the intersection ∩ of 110 and 001;
assuming such Boolean operations at
the basis of dialectical negation is like
considering the integer 13 as the sum 1
+ 3. Now this is precisely what logici-
ans do frequently, when they intend to
condemn Hegel’s logic of contradiction
by applying the operation of intersec-
tion as, e.g., in 100 ∩ 011 = 000. Con-
tradiction is neither exclusive nor in-
clusive, in the dynamic perspective of
dialectics where falsehood merely de-
signates a later stage of truth: neither
intersection nor union do make sense
hereby, although they easily render the
ideas of exclusive and inclusive contra-
diction.
So there is no contradiction for Heracli-
tus, we said. That is: there is no pure
Non-Being from his viewpoint, symbo-
lized by complete sequences of 0 in the
above diagrams. Actually, the opera-
tion liable to make sense of dialectical
negation is the operation of aggregation
or addition in a domain of integers. In
other words, dialectical negation pro-
ceeds like a successor-forming operator
Sxn+1 applied to natural integers x such
that S(n) = n+ 1.
6. Ontological negation
We argued earlier that Heraclitus subs-
cribed to a semantic game of the kind
ARn1 = AR1, accepting everything and
never going beyond the realm of the
yes-answers. This can be explained by
the kind of model that characterizes the
way Heraclitus takes things to be. In
other words, there is a genuinely ontolo-
gical motivation behind Heraclitus’ se-
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mantics. Let us see to what extent there
cannot be any no-answer in his view-
point, i.e. why nothing can be excluded
from his set of beliefs.
Dialectics went through the present
work under two different senses. For
one thing, as the adequate description
of formal semantics within increasing
algebras, i.e., increasing domains of va-
lues resulting from a question-answer
process ARnm. Then the word has been
used in the sense of a threefold pro-
cess of thesis-anthesis-synthesis, as as-
sociated typically to Hegel and which
corresponds to its dialectical negation
or Aufhebung. Far from being impos-
sible, the values coming from this pro-
cess of ‘sursumption’ (by contrast with
the Kantian ‘subsumption’) proceed by
exceeding a given set of elements whilst
conserving them in the form of even
more structured and aggregated values;
it is to be recalled here the analogy with
the method consisting in adding one
bit, in the binary interpretation system
of dialectics. Identity and difference
between objects are conflated by this
way; so is the case for propositions and
individuals, so long as the successive le-
vels of discourse are not taken into ac-
count to distinguish the forms of cumu-
lative of identity and the primary object
(the ‘Absolute’). These values are not
truth-values in the logical sense of the
word, however, if one considers these as
exclusive subsets that help to define the
relation of logical consequence thanks
to a minimal demarcation line between
designated and non-designated values
in a given domain.
An essential precondition to make the
allegedly ‘impossible values’ possible is
replacing the initial issue introduced by
speakers in a dialogue: logicians deal
with consequence as a relation of pre-
servation, whereas Heraclitus or Na-
garjuna have nothing to preserve and
always have ontology in mind when
they talk about truth and falsehood.
Admittedly, there is a link between
truth-values and integers, especially in
the area of many-valued logics where
truth-values count more than n = 2
elements. But again, neither Bernays
(1926) nor Suszko (1977) would endow
these values with another sense than
being various elements belonging to
either of the two necessary and suffici-
ent sets –the set of designated and non-
designated values, in order to prove the
independence of axioms among a given
set of propositions. We argued that di-
alectics is quite another story: values
are single elements within a theory, i.e.
a set of increasing propositions, insofar
as the expanding domain of values is on
a par with the expanding set of propo-
sitions in a corresponding language.
Borrowing from the theory of na-
ming in philosophy of language, we ar-
gue that truth-values (or semantic pre-
dicates) can be viewed as kinds of pro-
per names.
In the Fregean sense of proper names,
or in the Russellian theory of definite
descriptions, a name corresponds to a
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number of objects that are truly predi-
cated of it. This entails that more than
one individual can be given the same
proper name in this broad sense of the
word, just as the True may be assigned
to a large class of propositions. The-
refore, the normal course of logic is to
deal with truth-values as Fregean pro-
per names; but there is another way of
considering proper names, and we ar-
gue that that one is able to make sense
of a ‘dialectical logic’. In the Millian
or Kripkean approach to proper names,
indeed, these ones correspond to radi-
cally singular terms that cannot be as-
signed to more than one individual. In
the same vein, the dialectical process
of expansion is such that every seman-
tic predicate characterizes a new uni-
que individual. The cardinality of these
truth-values may thus vary according
to the underlying theory of logic and
language –it depends upon whether the
theory assumes bivalence or not. Now
the debate we articulated around Hera-
clitus, Nagarjuna or the pseudo-Hegel
does not deal with this logical issue of
dealing with consequence; it is about
ontology, so that truth-values are not
properties of propositions but, rather,
names of individual objects.
If such is the case, then some ontolo-
gical commitment reappears through
the issue of ‘impossible values’. That
is, each logical system intends to pro-
vide rules of discourse through a given
language. Language is a set of propo-
sitions and, supposing that the corres-
ponding speech-acts are limited to af-
firmative acts related to what there is,
the logician deals with truth-values and
methods for preserving some of these
(whether they be unique, or not) among
a set of propositions, from the premises
until the conclusion. Now what is the
point of preserving that which cannot
be lost, whenever everything or nothing
is taken to be true according to some
peculiar speakers? Here is the most se-
rious reason to consider dialectical ne-
gation as a non-logical negation, prefe-
rably to the account of an ontological
negation mapping into a unique object
that does not exist before that very pro-
cess of mapping. No homomorphism
proceeds from a domain of values Vnm
into itself with dialectical negation, the
latter being characterized as a model-
expanding operator dn that has nothing
to do with the usual sentential operator
of logic:
dn(Vnm) = Vnm + 1
Thus, such a higher-order and non-
sentential negation is a mapping Vnm
into Vnm + 1 whose function extends the
domain of values itself, irrespective of
the question whether truth is preserved
between the first and the second object
–this is always the case with Heraclitus,
so that such a question is trivial from
his point of view.
To give a schematic account, every
thing proceeds from the absolute Being
in the Heraclitean (or Hegelian) monist
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world, whereas every thing seems to
proceed from the absolute Non-Being
in the illusory world of Nagarjuna (or
the Buddhist philosophers). Conse-
quently, any proposition should parti-
cipate of truth for the former, of falsity
for the former. It is as if nothing can-
not not be true, according to Heraclitus;
whereas nothing cannot not be false,
according to Nagarjuna. Everything
must be accepted, according to Hera-
clitus; everything must be rejected, ac-
cording to Nagarjuna. Starting from
this logical and ontological framework
where propositions are merely truth-
values accepted or rejected by speakers,
the dual behavior of our two abnormal
speakers echoes with Bahm (1958), ac-
cording to whom the Jain and Buddhist
logics are dual and stand for opposite
propositional attitudes. However, our
own point is that one should not cha-
racterize such speakers within one and
the same semantic game ARn1 = AR1.
This holds only for Heraclitus, whe-
reas a proper semantic game for Na-
garjuna should rather be ARn0 = AR0.
His unique ‘answer’ is a non-answer of
silence that comes from the vacuous
state of the world in which nothing is to
be properly answered, even negatively.
For this reason, we depart from Pri-
est (2010) by viewing only one way of
interpreting the semantic predicate of
truth according to Heraclitus and Na-
garjuna: as a relative truth with the for-
mer speaker, hence his positive answer
to any sentential question; as an abso-
lute truth with the latter speaker, hence
his stance of silence for want of any
thing to be answered either positively
or negatively.
As a conclusion, does it eventually
make sense to question speakers like
Heraclitus and Nagarjuna? It does not,
so long as the underlying concepts of
truth and falsehood are to be unders-
tood in the sole light of a logical pro-
cess of dichotomy between accepted and
rejected statements. It does, so long as
the quest for alternative ways of thin-
king how things are is at stake. We
need to enlarge the language game to
make sense of abnormal answers, for
this purpose, and we take the semantic
framework ARnm to be in position to do
so.
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